I. Introduction
A train derails, killing hundreds of people. Representatives of the decedents sue
the train company in state court after finding that the accident was a result of a defective
part in the brakes. The train company removes to federal court and impleads both the
brake manufacturer, a foreign company indirectly owned by a foreign government, and
the brake manufacturer’s subsidiaries, which manufactured the defective part.
Can the train company proceed with its impleader action against the brake
manufacturer’s subsidiaries? Is the brake manufacturer’s subsidiary immune from
litigation under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”)? The FSIA provides the
exclusive means by which a federal court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a
foreign state and its instrumentalities.1 The FSIA provides that “[a]ny civil action
brought in State court against a foreign state … may be removed by the foreign state to
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending.”2 Whether the foreign company would be afforded
immunity by the FSIA depends on whether the company is considered an “agency or
instrumentality” because the company is owned by a foreign government.
Prior to 2003, the circuits were split over whether the FSIA confers federal
subject matter jurisdiction on the lower tiers of a multi-tiered subsidiary which is
majority owned by a foreign state or its political subdivision, or whether federal
jurisdiction should be limited to first-tier subsidiaries.3 The Ninth Circuit refused to
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presume that all levels of a corporation, which are majority-owned by a foreign state,
enjoy immunity from suit under the FSIA.4 Instead, the court held that the FSIA only
grants immunity to a foreign corporation which is directly owned by a foreign state. This
approach is called the “direct ownership” approach. The Seventh Circuit, on the other
hand, held that the FSIA grants immunity to foreign corporations which are both directly,
and indirectly, owned by a foreign state. This approach is called the “multi-tier
subsidiary” approach.
To illustrate the different outcomes produced by the direct ownership and multitier subsidiary approaches, assume that the brake manufacturer in the train derailment
hypothetical is a corporation that is 75% owned by a foreign government. Both the Ninth
and Seventh Circuits agreed that the FSIA would confer federal subject matter
jurisdiction on the brake manufacturer (and require dismissal of any suit filed against it)
because it is majority owned by the foreign state. However, if the brake manufacturer in
turn owns 60% of the shares of the subsidiary which manufactured the defective part, the
Ninth Circuit would not have upheld jurisdiction (and would not require dismissal) over
the subsidiary, whereas the Seventh Circuit would. This is because the Ninth Circuit
interpreted the FSIA’s definition of an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state as
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not including the lower tiers of a multi-tiered corporation.5 Because the Ninth Circuit did
not consider lower tiers to be agencies or instrumentalities, the court did not extend
immunity beyond the first tier of the corporation. The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand,
did not limit immunity to the first tier, but rather extended it to all tiers of the
corporation.6
The split was mended in the April, 2003 United States Supreme case of
Patrickson v. Dole Foods.7 This decision adopted the Ninth Circuit approach and held
that only direct ownership of a majority of a company’s shares by a foreign state qualifies
that company for immunity. To illustrate, if the recent Supreme Court ruling was applied
in the train derailment hypothetical, only the brake manufacturer would be entitled to
sovereign immunity. The brake manufacturer’s subsidiary, on the other hand, would still
be subject to suit in both state and federal court.
While the Patrickson Court resolved the split in authority between the Seventh
and Ninth Circuit, the court did not consider a third approach to the issue. Prior to
Patrickson, Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York had suggested a
“beneficial interest” approach to determine whether a lower tier subsidiary of a foreign
government-owned corporation should be allowed protection under the FSIA.8 The
“beneficial interest” approach would grant immunity only if the foreign state’s interest in
it’s subsidiary exceeds 50%. Thus, the beneficial interest approach advances
congressional intent by ensuring that immunity will only be granted where the foreign
state holds a substantial interest in a company.
5

See supra note 4.
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
7
123 S.Ct. 1655 (2003).
8
Musopole v. South African Airways (Pty.) Ltd., No. 01-CIV 3384 LAK, 2001 WL 1329196 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
6

3

This paper argues that the Congress should legislatively overrule the Dole
decision and adopt the “beneficial interest test” for determining whether a corporation
should enjoy federal subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. Therefore, Part II of this
paper explains the purpose of the FSIA and describes its significance concerning
litigation with a corporation which could potentially be granted immunity by the Act.
Part III describes the pre-Patrickson circuit split as well as the beneficial interest
approach proposed by Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York. Part IV
discusses the 2003 United States Supreme Court decision of Patrickson v. Dole Foods, in
which the Court held that the FSIA confers sovereign immunity upon a foreign company
which is directly owned by a foreign government.
Part V analyzes the various approaches. It proposes that the courts use a
“beneficial interest” test to determine whether a subsidiary of a company, partially owned
by a foreign government, should benefit from immunity under the FSIA. This test is
consistent with the statutory language and legislative intent of the FSIA. It promotes
United State foreign policy by ensuring that immunity is extended to – but only to – a
corporation in which a foreign nation owns a substantial interest in the corporation. It
provides a bright-line, quantifiable rule which courts can use to determine whether a
foreign defendant corporation should be granted immunity from suit in United States
Courts. Part VI concludes.

II.

Background
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 was enacted to answer questions

regarding whether a foreign state-owned corporation sued in United States courts by a
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domestic plaintiff should be granted immunity. Historically, all foreign states were
granted absolute sovereign immunity from suit in United States courts.9 However,
starting in the mid-1900’s, the United States’ views on immunity began to change.10 The
practices ranged from absolute immunity to a theory of restrictive immunity, which was
finally codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. An overview of this
progression is discussed below.

A. The Absolute Theory of Sovereign Immunity
Originally, it was the job of the State Department to make formal suggestions to
the courts to aid in determining whether a foreign state should enjoy immunity from suit
in United States courts.11 These decisions were made pursuant to recommendations made
by the Executive branch.12 Until 1952, the State Department requested absolute
immunity to all nations which were friendly with the United States.13 Eventually this
process became more political than legal because the Executive branch was under
pressure by the foreign states.14 Thus, oftentimes immunity was granted due to political
considerations in situations where immunity would not normally have been extended.15
However, when a foreign state failed to ask the State Department for immunity, the
courts were required to make the ultimate decision to grant or withhold immunity.
Because immunity could be decided either by the Executive or Judicial branch, and as a
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result of the lack of a clear standard which each branch should follow in making its
determination, decisions were inconsistent.16
This confusion began to fester when the Supreme Court established the theory of
absolute immunity for foreign states in its 1812 decision of The Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden.17 The Court determined that United States courts could not exercise
jurisdiction over a French sailing vessel found in United States waters. Lower federal
courts read this opinion to mean that foreign states were entitled to an absolute immunity
over their public governmental acts as well as their commercial activities.18 Nearly 100
years later the Court reaffirmed its decision to confer absolute immunity on foreign states
in Berizzi Brothers Co. v. The Pesaro19. In this case, the Supreme Court found that an
Italian ship, which carried both passengers and cargo, was immune from suit in American
courts. Thus, the Supreme Court established a theory of absolute immunity concerning a
foreign state’s public activities to which courts would adhere for 144 years.20

B. The Theory of Restrictive Immunity
During the first half of the Twentieth Century, legal commentators began to
notice that a theory of restrictive immunity was becoming increasingly more prevalent
internationally.21 American commentators began to advocate for a move towards a more
restrictive theory of immunity, which limited immunity to the public acts of foreign
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sovereigns.22 Under this theory the private and commercial activities of a foreign
sovereign were not protected.
In a famed 1952 letter, Jack Tate, the Legal Advisor to the State Department,
announced to the American judiciary that the United States would formally adopt a
restrictive theory of immunity.23 This theory granted immunity for a nation’s public acts,
but did not extend immunity to private acts.24 In support of the decision to adopt the new
theory, Tate cited reasons such as the growing international reliance on a restrictive
theory of immunity, as well as the United States’ increasing involvement in international
trade.25
Although the State Department strove to adhere to this new policy, determinations
were still frequently made on a political, rather than a legal, basis. Oftentimes defendants
were granted immunity although the restrictive theory would have prohibited the grant.26
For example, if the prevailing immunity doctrine at the time of Berizzi Brothers Co. v.
The Pesaro was that of restrictive immunity, the courts would have been required to
preclude immunity because the Italian sailing vessel carried both passengers and cargo
and therefore, was conducting private business. In short, a strict application of restrictive
immunity will not confer immunity upon a private sailing vessel conducting private
business. If, however, the sailing vessel was conducting government business, it would
have been granted sovereign immunity like that awarded to the foreign government.
However, the Berizzi Brothers court did not adhere to the doctrine of restrictive immunity
22
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because State Department believed it was in the best interest of foreign relations to
remain friendly with the Italian government. Thus, the State Department recommended
granting immunity although the act was a private act. The decision to grant immunity
was based wholly on the political interests rather than the restrictive immunity doctrine.
Because the State Department continued to recommend granting immunity on a
political, rather than legal, basis, decisions were inconsistent.27 Courts similarly had
trouble developing a bright line rule which would draw a line between the public and
commercial, or private, activities of a foreign state.28 For example, in Mexico v.
Hoffman,29 the Supreme Court refused to extend immunity to a sailing vessel owned by,
but not in the possession of, the Mexican government. The Court justified this decision
by stating,
Every judicial action exercising or relinquishing
jurisdiction over the vessel of a foreign government has its
effect upon our relations with that government. Hence it is
a guiding principle in determining whether a court should
exercise or surrender its jurisdiction in such cases, that the
courts should not so act as to embarrass the executive arm
in its conduct of foreign affairs. In such cases the judicial
department of this government follows the action of the
political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.30
In an effort to eliminate the confusion, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) in 1976.31
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C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
The FSIA codifies the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.32 It is also the
sole means by which a federal court may establish jurisdiction over a foreign state.33 In
part, the FSIA says that “… a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States … .”34 Congress designed the FSIA to
alleviate the pressure placed on the State Department, in making decisions regarding
whether a foreign defendant is immune from litigation in American courts, by shifting the
burden to the judiciary.35
The FSIA confers federal jurisdiction over foreign states and their
instrumentalities in an attempt to achieve uniformity in decisions regarding foreign
defendants.36 The FSIA is only triggered when an American plaintiff files suit in an
American court against a foreign state, or a foreign state-owned corporation.37 Congress
intended that the FSIA, through its definition of “foreign state,” would establish standards
for determining immunity, thus promoting uniformity in cases involving foreign
governments.38 Section 1603 of the Act provides that a “foreign state”
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state ….An agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state’ means any entity (1) which is a separate legal person,
corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
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thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of the United States .… nor
created under the laws of any third country.39
Once the foreign defendant establishes a prima facie case that it is a “foreign
state” as defined by the Act, it is permitted to remove the action to federal court pursuant
to the FSIA.40 If found to be a “foreign state” under the Act, and not subject to one of
the exceptions set forth in §1605,41 the defendant is immune from suit, and the action is
dismissed.42 If, however, the defendant is subject to one of the aforementioned
exceptions, it is entitled to a bench trial.43 The bench trial is a further attempt to establish
uniformity in proceedings against “foreign state” defendants.44 A bench trial is designed
to help maintain uniformity in two ways. First, the court’s decision rests entirely upon
the judge, instead of a jury decision whose findings may be inconsistent with other juries
presented with similar cases. Second, subjecting a foreign defendant to a trial by jury
would not promote uniformity in decisions because the defendant would be subject to
potentially adverse biases espoused by members of the jury.45 For these reasons, the
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FSIA confers immunity from a law suit on a foreign state, or when an exception to the
immunity applies, provides a foreign with the right to a non-jury trial in federal court.46
Typically, however, if the defendant is not immune from suit under the FSIA, it
will move to dismiss on a theory of forum non conveniens. This doctrine authorizes a
trial court to deny jurisdiction, even though the court has venue, when the court believes
that the action may be more appropriately and justly tried in a court in another forum.47
If the motion is granted, the suit will be dismissed, and short of bringing the action in
another country, the plaintiffs will not have any remedy.
Consequently, under the FSIA, a suit may be dismissed for jurisdictional reasons
before the parties are even able to begin discovery. In this event, an injured party may
have no means of recovery against a foreign owned company, particularly if it is
impractical for the plaintiff to bring the suit in the defendant’s country. The FSIA,
however, was only enacted to provide a framework upon which courts can rely to
determine immunity. The American public’s interest in avenging a wrong committed
upon a particular plaintiff was not considered when the Act was drafted. Instead, by
enacting the FSIA, Congress sought to create a standard, which would allow the
executive branch to conduct successful, and consistent, foreign policy. Because it is not
in the best interest of foreign policy to allow frivolous suits against foreign governments
and government-owned corporations, it is best to satisfy potential plaintiffs by, at least,
providing a consistent determination of when corporations will be protected under the
FSIA.
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Although the FISA aims to provide a bright-line rule for the application of
sovereign immunity, it fails because the language is ambiguous. The Act effectively
gives immunity to a “foreign state.” However, the definition of “foreign state” is
ambiguous. The FSIA defines “foreign state” as “include[ing] a political subdivision of a
foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.”48 The ambiguity lies in
whether an “agency or instrumentality” is a foreign state or whether an “agency or
instrumentality” is merely included in, or part of, a foreign state. Until the United States
Supreme Court decision of Patrickson v. Dole Foods49 the circuits were split over this
very issue.

III.

The Pre- Patrickson Circuit Split
Although the FSIA was enacted to provide a standard which could be relied upon

when determining sovereign immunity, the courts are inconsistent in their interpretations
of the Act. A uniform interpretation of the FSIA is important because it will effectuate
Congress’ intent to ensure consistent foreign policy. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits
created the split when they interpreted differently the ambiguous wording of the FSIA.
In Gates v. Victor Fine Foods50 the Ninth Circuit limited sovereign immunity to the first
tier of a multi-tiered corporation which is majority owned by a foreign government.
However, in 1996, one year after the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Gates, the Seventh
Circuit extended immunity to the lower tiers of a multi-tiered government-owned
corporation in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994.51
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The ambiguity centers on the Act’s definition of “agency or instrumentality.” An
analysis of both approaches follows.

A. The Ninth Circuit Only Protects the First Tier of a Corporation
Until the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,52 courts
presumed that all levels of a multi-tiered corporation owned by a foreign state fell under
the classification of “foreign state” for purposes of the FSIA, and in such cases federal
courts would maintain subject matter jurisdiction and dismiss the case.53 However, in
Gates, a landmark decision, the Ninth Circuit found that an indirectly-owned subsidiary
of a “foreign state” was not itself a “foreign state,” and therefore was not afforded
immunity under the FSIA.54
One defendant in this suit was Alberta Pork Producers Development Corporation
(“Alberta Pork”), which was established pursuant to a Canadian statute55 to facilitate the
marketing and promotion of hogs grown in Alberta, Canada.56 Alberta Pork acquired
Fletcher Fine Foods (“FFF”), which was parent to Golden Gate Fresh Foods (“GGFF”), a
California pork processing plant, operating under the name Victor Fine Foods. GGFF
provided a welfare benefit plan to its employees.57 When the company went out of
business without giving its employees 60 days notice of its plans to close and to
discontinue the welfare benefits plan, the employees filed a class action against GGFF,
Alberta Pork, and FFF alleging a violation of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
52
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Notification Act58 and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985.59
Alberta Pork and FFF moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
the FSIA.60 There was no dispute as to whether Alberta Pork met the first two elements
under the FSIA to be considered an agency or instrumentality of the Province of
Alberta.61 The problem arose in determining whether FFF was similarly protected from
suit by the FSIA as an “organ[]” of a foreign state or a political subdivision, or majorityowned by a foreign state or its political subdivision.62
The Ninth Circuit held that FFF was not an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state, and advanced four reasons why FFF was not protected under the FSIA.63 First, the
court looked to the language of the statute to determine whether an “agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state” was itself a “foreign state.”64 Second, the court
analyzed the Congressional Record, and found that Congress did not intend “agency or
instrumentality” to be synonymous with “foreign state.”65 Third, the court found that if
Congress had intended to allow successive tiering of a corporation, it would have
expressly done so.66 Fourth, the court concluded that FFF could only be an “agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state” if the majority of its shares was directly owned by a
foreign state.67
The Ninth Circuit first argued that a close reading of the statutory language
implies that an “agency or instrumentality” was not itself a “foreign state” for purposes of
58
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the Act.68 The statute provides that a foreign state “includes a political subdivision of a
foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.”69 The Gates court
theorized that the word “includes” does not equate an “agency or instrumentality” with a
foreign state.70 Instead, the “agency or instrumentality” enjoys the protection bestowed
upon a foreign state under the FSIA, but is not itself a foreign state.71 Further, an
“agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” is “an organ of a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned
by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.”72 In combining both definitions, a
strict statutory interpretation would not allow successive tiering of a corporation because
the “agency or instrumentality” must be owned by the foreign state or a political
subdivision thereof, or the foreign state must hold a majority interest in the corporation.73
Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, FFF was not an “agency or instrumentality” because
it is not directly owned by a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof.74 Rather, FFF
was owned by an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.”
The Ninth Circuit’s second argument was that a strict interpretation of the Act
suggests that Congress did not intend “agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state” to
be synonymous with “foreign state.”75 The remainder of the statute takes great care to
differentiate between the two.76 For example, the House Report Congress states:
where ownership is divided between a foreign state and private interests,
the entity will be deemed to be an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
68
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state only if a majority of the ownership interests (shares of stock or
otherwise) is owned by a foreign state or by a foreign state’s political
subdivision. 77

If Congress had intended that “foreign state” was the same as “agency or
instrumentality,” then it would also have intended to equate “foreign state” with “political
subdivision.”78 However, the Ninth Circuit found that this was highly unlikely for two
reasons. First, if “political subdivision” is synonymous with “foreign state” then there
was no need to mention “political subdivision.”79 However, the dictionary meaning of
“political subdivision” implies that it is a part of a larger body.80 This larger body
referred to in the definition of “political subdivision” is a “foreign state,” as it is logical
that a “foreign state” would have a “political subdivision.”81 Thus, just as a “political
subdivision” is not the same as a “foreign state,” an “agency or instrumentality” is also
not synonymous with “foreign state.”82
This rationale led the court to hold that in order for an entity to enjoy immunity
under the FSIA, a “foreign state” must directly own a majority of its shares. By
definition, an “agency or instrumentality” must be majority owned by a “foreign state.”
An “agency or instrumentality” cannot, itself, be a “foreign state.”83 Thus, a whollyowned subsidiary of an “agency or instrumentality,” which is not itself a “foreign state”
is not immune from suit in United States courts because it is not an “agency or
instrumentality.”84 Accordingly, a second-tier subsidiary which is owned by an agency
77
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or instrumentality of a foreign state is not protected under the FSIA because it is not itself
an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,” but a subsidiary of an “agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state.”85
The Ninth Circuit’s third argument for holding that FFF was not an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state was based on Congressional intent. The court reasoned
that, had Congress intended to allow successive tiering of a corporation in order to invoke
the immunities in the FSIA, Congress could have expressly done so in the Act.86 Thus, to
read the Act differently would provide a blanket immunity for all corporations that are
partially owned by a foreign state, or a subdivision thereof, regardless of how far down
the chain of ownership the entity may fall. The court was reluctant to confer such a broad
view of sovereign immunity when the Court could not find this intent in the language
itself.87
The Ninth Circuit’s fourth argument for holding that FFF was not an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state was based on Alberta’s ownership interest in FFF. The
Court analyzed the company’s direct ownership to determine whether FFF was an agency
or instrumentality of Canada. FFF could only be an “agency or instrumentality” if the
majority of its shares were owned by “a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.”
Because Alberta Pork owned 100% of FFF’s shares, and Alberta Pork was deemed an
“agency or instrumentality” of the province of Alberta, FFF was not owned by a “foreign
state,” and therefore was not awarded immunity under the FSIA.88 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that a wholly owned subsidiary of an “agency or instrumentality of a
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foreign state” is not itself a foreign state, and therefore is not afforded protection under
the FSIA.
For example, the Ninth Circuit noted that Congress intended the terms “organ”
and “agency or instrumentality” to be broadly construed.89 The Court cited to language
in the record which spoke about the definition of an “agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state.”90 Congress noted:
entities which meet the definition of an “agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state” could assume a variety of forms, including a state trading
corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport organization such as a
shipping line or airline, a steel company, a central bank, an export
association, a governmental procurement agency or a department or
ministry which acts and is suable in its own name.
The Court further noticed that Congress was careful to make the distinction between
foreign states, political subdivisions, and agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states
and political subdivisions.91 Had Congress intended “agency or instrumentality” to be
synonymous with “foreign state,” they could have easily drafted the language to read that
an entity must be owned by a foreign state, political subdivision, or agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state or political subdivision. Additionally, the Court feared
that the opposite reading, such as that subscribed to by the Seventh Circuit, would expand
the immunity beyond Congress’ intent because it would allow an endless chain of “nth”
tier subsidiaries to claim immunity under the FSIA.92 Thus, the Ninth Circuit analyzed
Congressional intent to aid in its interpretation of the FSIA.93
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B.

The Seventh Circuit Protects Lower Tiers of a Corporation

The Seventh Circuit, joined by the Fifth94 and Sixth95 Circuits, found that an
“agency or instrumentality,” by virtue of its status as a “foreign state,” would enjoy
immunity under the FSIA unless it falls into one of the exceptions defined in 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1605.96 Thus, where a second-tier subsidiary which is majority owned by an “agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state” is also an “agency or instrumentality” of the foreign
state, that subsidiary is subject to federal subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. 97
This principle was established in In re Air Crash Diaster Near Roselawn, Indiana
on October 31, 1994.98 American Eagle flight 4184 developed icing problems and
crashed, killing 68 passengers.99 The victims’ families filed a wrongful death claim
against Avions de Transport Regional, G.I.E. (“ATR”), the company which manufactured
the airplane.100 ATR was indirectly owned by the French and Italian governments.101
Because ATR was either named as a defendant or a third party defendant in all of the
suits, ATR sought to remove the case to federal court pursuant to the FSIA.102
The plaintiffs argued that ATR did not qualify as a “foreign state” and therefore
the suit was not removable to federal court.103 To determine whether ATR was subject to
immunity under the FSIA, the district court analyzed the ownership structure.104 ATR
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was created in 1982 as a joint-venture by the Italian and French governments, and was
ultimately created under French law.105 Aerospatiale, Societe Nationale Industrielle, S.A.
(“SNIA”) was the French national aerospace company.106 The French government
owned 91.42% of SNIA.107 Alenia was a subdivision of Finmeccanica SpA, which was
62.14% owned by the Italian Instituto Per La Riconstruzione (“IRI”).108 IRI was a
holding company which was 100% owned by the Italian government.109 Thus, the
French and Italian governments indirectly owned 75% of ATR.110
The court extended immunity under the FSIA because ATR was indirectly owned
by the French and Italian governments. In reaching this conclusion, the court first looked
to the language of the statute. The court found that Congress intended the FSIA to
include entities other than the actual foreign state, as evidenced by the Congressional
House Reports which stated, “entities which meet the definition of an ‘agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state’ could assume a variety of forms, including … a
transport organization such as a[n] … airline.”111
The Seventh Circuit also noted that Congress intended the FSIA to protect foreign
governments as well as separately incorporated entities such as airlines or shipping lines
in concluding that the FSIA extended immunity to entities other than foreign
governments.112 The Seventh Circuit cited to language in the Congressional Record
which said that agencies or instrumentalities could assume “a variety of forms” including
105
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“a transport organization such as an airline.”113 For example, the Court centered the
majority of its argument around Congress’ use of an airline as an example of an entity
which might be covered by the FSIA.114 Thus, the Court interpreted this language to
preclude limiting immunity to entities that are directly owned by a foreign state or
political subdivision of a foreign state.115
Second, because ATR was owned by two separate governments, the court had to
decide whether governments could “pool” their interests to create a majority
ownership.116 This was significant because each government owned roughly half of
ATR’s shares. The court relied on the decisions of other jurisdictions, which reasoned
that the statute did not specify that the majority interest must be owned by one state, to
determine that pooling was allowed.117
Third, the Court considered whether the lower tiers of a corporation could
establish foreign state status.118 The plaintiffs argued that ATR could not remove to
federal court because although it was owned by a foreign state, its ownership was
indirect. Although SNIA was an instrumentality of a foreign state, Alenia was a
subsidiary of an instrumentality of a foreign state. Thus, the plaintiffs argued that §
1603(b) required that both entities be owned directly by a foreign state. To support their
argument, plaintiffs cited to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,
which held that an indirectly owned subsidiary of a foreign state was not afforded
immunity under the FSIA.119
113
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Contrary to the Gates decision, the Seventh Circuit found that the word
“includes” in the Act mandated a broad definition of “foreign state.”120 The Seventh
Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit when it found that the word “includes” requires
that the phrase “agency or instrumentality” is synonymous with “foreign state.”121
Therefore, an entity which is majority owned by an “agency or instrumentality” of a
foreign state is synonymous with an entity that is majority owned by a “foreign state.”122
Consequently, if a foreign state “includes” an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state” then a corporation that is majority owned by a foreign state “includes” a
corporation that is owned by an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.”123 Thus,
the court argued that the Act does not expressly require that a corporation be directly
owned by a foreign state.
Consequently, the court held that an indirect or tiered majority ownership is
sufficient to qualify an entity as a foreign state. Shortly thereafter, the Fifth124 Circuit
also followed suit. The Sixth Circuit similarly held that a corporation that is indirectly
owned by a foreign state qualifies as an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state for
purposes of the FSIA.125 According to these circuits, the FSIA does not draw a
distinction between direct and indirect ownership, and therefore does not expressly
impose a requirement of direct ownership by a foreign state upon an entity in order to
acquire immunity under the FSIA.126 Thus, the Seventh Circuit articulated the majority
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view which is that direct ownership by a foreign state is not required in order to sustain
federal subject matter jurisdiction on a foreign defendant.

C.

The Split Within the Southern District of New York

The Second Circuit has not yet ruled on the issue, and district courts within the
circuit are split.127 Two recent inconsistent decisions from the Southern District of New
York suggest a possible solution to the problem.
The first decision, Musopole v. South African Airways (PTY.) Ltd,128 a decision by
the Southern District of New York, involved a plaintiff who claimed she was harassed by
an employee of South African Airways, Ltd. (SAA) when the employee refused to let her
board the airplane. The plaintiff sued in New York state court alleging tort and contract
claims against SAA.129 SAA then removed the case to the Southern District of New
York, alleging foreign state status under the FSIA.130
Judge Kaplan the Southern District of New York found that SAA qualified for
immunity under the FSIA because 80% of SAA’s shares were owned by Transnet Ltd., a
South African corporation controlled by South Africa’s Minister for Public
Enterprises.131 Both parties agreed that SAA was neither a political subdivision nor an
organ of the South African government.132 The dispute was over whether SAA was an
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agency or instrumentality of Transnet.133 If so, SAA would also enjoy immunity from
suit under the FSIA.
Before arriving at this conclusion, Judge Kaplan looked to both the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits for guidance. Judge Kaplan relied heavily on the Gates decision, but
nonetheless reached the opposite conclusion. First, Judge Kaplan identified that the
argument for allowing jurisdiction was that Transnet was, undisputedly, an agency or
instrumentality of the South African government.134 Thus, Transnet was a “foreign
state.” Because Transnet, the first-tier subsidiary, was an “agency or instrumentality,”
and it owned 80% of SAA’s stock, then SAA likewise enjoyed immunity as an “agency
or instrumentality” of the South African Government. 135
Judge Kaplan’s conclusion in Musopole was opposite that of the Gates court. In
arriving at this conclusion Judge Kaplan noted that the Ninth Circuit questioned whether
this was the result Congress intended in drafting the statute.136 As mentioned above (§
III, A) the Gates court reasoned that the language provided that a foreign state “includes”
an agency or instrumentality, not that it is an agency or instrumentality. Further, the
Musopole court reasoned that, had Congress intended a second-tier subsidiary to fall
under the immunity offered by FSIA, then it would have expressly stated so in the act by
using clear language.137
The court further relied on the Seventh138 and Ninth139 Circuit’s opinions which
examined parts of the Congressional Record to determine Congress’s intent. However,
133
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Judge Kaplan was more concerned with a different section of the record. He argued that
Congress enacted the FSIA to provide federal jurisdiction, and a non-jury trial, to a
foreign state where the outcome of the trial might effect “the ability of the executive
branch to conduct successful foreign policy.”140 Judge Kaplan found this to be
significant, because a trial by jury might not be fair if the members of the jury are
particularly biased against the foreign defendant because of its nationality.141 To allow
the first tier of a foreign corporation federal jurisdiction, but not the second-tier may
defeat Congress’s intent where the foreign government indirectly holds a majority
interest in the second-tier subsidiary, because the government will still be subject to the
problems involved with a jury trial if it is not immune from suit, or allowed a non-jury
trial.142 Thus, drawing the line after the first tier is an arbitrary distinction because it
would not serve Congress’s intent in enacting the FSIA.
In dicta, Judge Kaplan suggested that the line might be drawn by looking to the
government’s beneficial interest in a company rather than the actual interest.143 For
example, if a government owned 51% of the shares in a given company, and that
company owned 51% of it’s subsidiary, then the government’s beneficial interest would
only amount to 26%.144 In this case, the second tier would not be considered an “agency
or instrumentality” because the government only enjoyed approximately a one-quarter
interest in the company. However, if court looks at percentage of actual ownership, the
government would hold an actual 51% interest, and federal courts might hold jurisdiction
over the company depending on whether the court follows the Seventh or Ninth Circuit.
140
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Judge Kaplan declined to formulate this rule, however because, the fact that the South
African government owned 80% of SAA’s shares through Transnet was immaterial to the
analysis.145 Thus, Judge Kaplan sustained federal question jurisdiction.146
To illustrate the beneficial interest approach, assume that Peru owns 51% of the
brake manufacturer. If the brake manufacturer owns 51% of the subsidiary that
manufactured the faulty part, then Peru would indirectly own 26.01% (0.51 x 0.51) of the
subsidiary.147 In contrast, if Bolivia owned 75% of Company C, which in turn owned
80% of Company D, Bolivia’s beneficial interest in Company D would be 0.75 x 0.80, or
60%, and the court would grant immunity. Because Peru has less than 50% interest in the
subsidiary, allowing the subsidiary protection under the FSIA is inconsistent with
Congress’ intent to “ensure that a federal forum was available where the interests of
foreign nation are involved in litigation that might effect the executive branch’s ability to
conduct successful foreign policy.”148 However, Bolivia holds more than 50% interest in
Company D. Accordingly, Bolivia holds a substantial beneficial interest in the outcome
of any litigation against Company D, and therefore Company D will be granted
immunity.
Thus, prior to Patrickson there was 3-way split of authority. There are two
opposing approaches advanced by the Circuit courts.149 In its 1995 decision in Gates v.
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Victor Fine Foods, the Ninth Circuit refused to extend immunity past the first tier of a
government-owned corporation. The opposite side of the issue is explained by the
Seventh Circuit in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31,
1994. Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York suggested a third approach,
the beneficial interest test, to determine whether a lower-tier of a foreign-owned
corporation should enjoy immunity from litigation under the FSIA.

IV.

The Supreme Court Opinion, Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court decided a case which arose in the Ninth

Circuit, Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson.150 The case involved banana workers from Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala and Panama who sued the Dole Food Company in state court
for Dole’s use of a pesticide known to cause, among other things, sterility, liver damage,
and miscarriages.151 Dole removed the action to federal court and implead two Israeli
companies (“Dead Sea Companies”), which had manufactured some of the pesticides
used by Dole. The two Israeli companies moved for dismissal pursuant to the FSIA.
Following its decision in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
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Dead Sea Companies were neither organs nor instrumentalities of the state of Israel.152 In
doing so, the court upheld its previous decision to limit immunity to wholly-owned
subsidiaries of a foreign government. Thus, in the Ninth Circuit held that a company
which is indirectly owned by a foreign government is not protected by the FSIA.
The primary issue153 before the Supreme Court was whether Dole could proceed
with its impleader action against the Dead Sea companies although the State of Israel
only indirectly owned the defendant companies. The answer turned on the interpretation
of the FSIA. The issue was whether the Dead Sea Companies were “agencies or
instrumentalities” of Israel, and therefore accorded the status of a foreign state under the
FSIA, because they were indirectly owned by the Israeli government at the time the suit
was filed. If so, the companies would be immune from suit, and the FSIA would require
dismissal of the action.
The Court, in a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy affirmed the Ninth
Circuit, and held that a company must be directly owned by a foreign government in
order to be afforded agency or instrumentality status for purposes of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. The Court arrived at its conclusion using the statutory text
and elementary principles of corporate law.154
First, the Court relied upon the statutory language when it concluded that, in order
to be deemed an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, a foreign government must
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directly own the company. The Court noted that the determination of whether a
corporation is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state depends on whether the
corporation is owned by a foreign state.155 For example, § 1603(b)(2) refers to ownership
of “shares.” Additionally, the Court noted that the words “other ownership interest”
when read together with “shares” must be interpreted to mean ownership interests other
than ownership of stock.156 Therefore, Congress intended ownership to depend on formal
corporate ownership, as opposed to ownership in a colloquial sense.157 Thus, in the brake
manufacturer hypothetical, because the foreign government holds a controlling interest in
the brake manufacturer, the foreign government will be immune from suit under the
FSIA. However, because the foreign government does not own a controlling interest in
the subsidiary which manufactured the faulty part, the subsidiary is not immune from
suit.
In further support of its corporate ownership theory, the Court noted that the same
section also refers to a “separate legal person, corporate or otherwise.”158 Through its
analysis of the text, the Court concluded that Congress intended the sovereign immunity
of a foreign corporation to be contingent upon on formal corporate ownership. If
Congress had intended the statute to refer to ownership in a fashion other than formal
corporate ownership, Congress was capable of doing so.159 Thus a foreign government
must either hold a controlling interest in the company’s stock, or own control of the
company in some other form.
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Second, Justice Kennedy found that a corporation is only immune from suit in
United States courts if the corporation is directly owned by a foreign government. This is
consistent with elementary principles of corporate law, which shield corporate investors
from liability notwithstanding severe wrongdoing such as commingling of corporate and
personal funds. Justice Kennedy began this section of his analysis by noting that a
corporation and its shareholders are separate and distinct entities.160 A shareholder, by
virtue of its ownership of shares, does not own the corporation’s assets.161 Thus, an
individual shareholder does not own the subsidiaries of a corporation.162 Accordingly,
the parent does not own, or have legal title to, the subsidiary of it’s subsidiary.163 If a
foreign corporation is afforded sovereign immunity solely because a foreign government
owns a controlling share of it’s parent company, the FSIA would, in effect, allow the
courts to pierce the corporate veil, thereby conferring immunity upon the corporation
based solely on the identity of it’s principal shareholders (the foreign government).164
Ordinarily, the corporate veil is pierced only when it is impossible to separate the actions
of the corporation from that of the shareholders. For example, piercing was not
warranted in the situation of the brake manufacturer because there was no intermingling
between the corporation and its owners. The business of a corporation did not become
the business of the government merely because the government held an interest in a
parent company. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Congress manifested its intent to
deny immunity to corporations which are not directly owned by a foreign government
through the statutory text and a reliance on the traditional rules of corporate ownership.
160
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The Court reasoned that the FSIA only extends sovereign immunity to a
corporation who is directly owned by a foreign government because the text of the statute
does not compel a conclusion that Congress intended to disregard the traditional rules of
corporate formalities and pierce the corporate veil in every case where a foreign
government holds some interest in a corporate defendant.165 Thus, the Court held that
Israel did not have direct ownership in either of the Dead Sea Companies, and therefore
the Dead Sea Companies were not afforded sovereign immunity under the FSIA.

V.

The Beneficial Interest Test
The Supreme Court, in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, mended the split among the

circuits over the meaning of the FSIA. The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit opinion and
held that only a corporation who is directly owned by a foreign government may be
granted immunity under the FSIA. Although the holding in Dole created a bright line
rule mandating who may be granted immunity under the FSIA, it did not address
Congress’ original concern in enacting the statute. Although Congress was concerned
with establishing uniformity in the granting of immunity, the underlying purpose of
foreign sovereign immunity was to promote amicable foreign relations. The recent
Supreme Court decision only advances one of these goals. Limiting immunity to a
corporation that is directly owned by a foreign government establishes a bright line rule
that produces uniformity in decisions to confer immunity upon a foreign sovereign.
However, this bright line rule fails to address Congress’ original purpose, which was to
promote successful foreign relations. Thus, Congress should legislatively override Dole
and create a new rule following Judge Kaplan’s “beneficial interest” test.
165
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In dicta, Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York suggested that the
Act may be read “as bringing second-and lower-tier subsidiaries of a foreign nation
within the definition of ‘foreign state’ provided that the foreign government beneficially
owns a majority of the shares of the entity in question.”166 For example, a company,
which is 51% owned by a foreign nation may own 51% of another company.167 The
foreign nation would beneficially own only 25% of the second tier subsidiary.168 Thus,
the FSIA would not apply to the second tier. However, there may be occasions where a
foreign nation may beneficially own an “nth” tier subsidiary. That tier would then be
allowed to remove to federal court under the FSIA in the event they are sued by a
domestic (US) plaintiff.
Consider the example of the train accident at the beginning of this article.
Assume that the foreign government owned 75% of the shares of the company who
owned 51% of the shares of the brake manufacturer. The foreign government, in this
case, would only hold a 38% beneficial interest in the brake manufacturer.169 Therefore,
according to the beneficial interest test, the foreign government does not hold a majority
beneficial interest in the brake manufacturer. Because the foreign government does not
hold more than a 50% beneficial interest, the brake manufacturer is not an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign sovereign, and cannot claim immunity under the FSIA.
The “beneficial interest” approach advanced by the Southern District of New
York in Musopole is the best test to use in determining whether an “nth” tier subsidiary of
a foreign government may benefit from the immunity extended under the FSIA for four
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reasons. First, this approach is the most consistent with the statutory language and
legislative intent of the FSIA. Second, this approach will alleviate the Ninth Circuit’s
concern that an endless chain of foreign corporations would be granted immunity because
their government had some minute ownership interest in the corporation. Third, allowing
courts to determine the beneficial interest a foreign government holds in a corporation
will create a predictable standard which domestic plaintiff’s can rely upon when deciding
whether to file suit against the corporation. Fourth, the “beneficial interest” approach is a
compromise between the decisions of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits.

A.

Consistent With Statutory Language and Legislative Intent.

The first reason why Congress should legislatively overrule Dole and codify the
beneficial interest test is because it is most consistent with the statutory language and
legislative intent of the FSIA. When drafting the FSIA, Congress endeavored to create a
bright-line rule, which would aid courts in determining whether a company should be
afforded sovereign immunity. Additionally, Congress did not intent to extend immunity
to defendants where the foreign government did not have a substantial interest in the
outcome of litigation. Accordingly, Congress drafted language, which conferred
immunity upon a “foreign state.”170 Congress defined “foreign state” as “include[ing]” a
political subdivision or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.171 Because the
language of the Act can be construed to confer immunity on a lower tiered subsidiary of a
foreign government-owned corporation, it is important to note that Congress did not
intend to extend immunity to an endless line of subsidiaries. For this reason, the
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beneficial interest approach is the best approach because it complies with Congress’
intent to limit immunity while still affording immunity to those companies where the
foreign government holds a substantial interest in the prosperity of the company. The
Dole decision, on the other hand, limits immunity to a company that is directly owned by
the foreign government. Dole does not contemplate the possibility that a foreign
government may hold a substantial interest in a lower tier subsidiary of a corporation.
Thus, Dole risks denying immunity to a foreign government-owned corporation where
the government has a substantial interest in the outcome of litigation merely because the
government does not directly own the corporation.

B.

Promotes U.S. Foreign Policy

The second reason why Congress should legislatively overrule Dole and codify
the beneficial interest test is because it remedies the concern advanced by the Ninth
Circuit that a broad interpretation of the FSIA falls prey to the prospect of granting
immunity to an endless chain of corporations merely because, somewhere, in the line of
ownership, a foreign government owned over 50% of its shares. The Ninth Circuit
would extend immunity upon a limited number of companies regardless of the actual
interest the foreign government held in the outcome of litigation. Although a foreign
government may hold a substantial interest in a company even though it is not the direct
owner of that company, the Ninth Circuit would deny immunity to that corporation
because it is a lower-tiered corporation. Thus, the Ninth Circuit approach, in some
instances, is inconsistent with Congressional intent because it does not insure the
advancement of United States foreign policy by conferring immunity upon a foreign

34

government-owned corporation where that government would have a substantial interest
in the outcome of litigation.
The “beneficial interest” test, however, alleviates this problem by ensuring that
immunity is extended, not only to a company which is directly owned by a foreign
government, but also when a foreign government holds a substantial “beneficial interest”
in that company. Thus, if the government only owns a 10% beneficial interest in an
entity, although it might technically own 51% of the entity’s stock, it would not enjoy
immunity under the FSIA. To illustrate, although the hypothetical foreign government
owns 51% of the shares of the brake manufacturer, its beneficial interest in the company
is only 38%, and is therefore not substantial. This is consistent with congressional intent
because Congress is not concerned with litigation whose outcome would not affect
United States foreign policy with the foreign defendant’s nation. A nation who only
holds a small beneficial interest in a company is not likely to be as interested in the
outcome of litigation as the foreign government who owns a large beneficial interest or
directly owns the company.

C.

Provides a Bright-Line Rule

The third reason why Congress should legislatively overrule Dole and codify the
beneficial interest test is because it provides a bright-line rule which allows the courts to
determine whether a foreign defendant corporation should be granted immunity from suit
in United States courts. By granting immunity only when a foreign government
beneficially owns a substantial interest in that company, courts achieve success in
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creating a standard for determining immunity to “foreign states.” This approach prevents
the extension of immunity to an endless line of corporations, and therefore, alleviates the
concerns of the Ninth Circuit. Additionally, the beneficial interest test is consistent with
the Seventh Circuit approach because it allows successive tiering instead of limiting
immunity to the first tier. Finally, the beneficial interest approach creates a uniform
standard which a domestic plaintiff may rely upon when deciding whether to file suit
against a foreign corporate defendant.

VI.

Conclusion
Congress intended the FISA to grant federal subject matter jurisdiction to foreign

states so that decisions regarding those states would be somewhat uniform. Uniformity in
the treatment of foreign states within the federal court system would further help to
advance the executive branch’s ability to conduct successful foreign policy.172
The meaning of sections 1603 (a) and (b) of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act has recently become a subject of hot debate. The Ninth
Circuit led the way in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods when it refused to extend federal
subject matter jurisdiction to the second-tier subsidiary of a government-owned
corporation. In 1996, one year later, the Seventh Circuit advanced a literal interpretation
of the act when it allowed successive tiering of a corporation for purposes of extending
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Recently, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have joined the
view of the Seventh in allowing successive tiering. Thus, the trend seems to be moving
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toward a broad definition of “agency or instrumentality” as found in the majority
opinions which allow successive tiering.
The Supreme Court ruled on the issue in its 2003 decision of Dole Food Co. v.
Patrickson.173 In an 8-1 opinion Justice Kennedy wrote that the FSIA grants immunity to
a corporate defendant that is directly owned by a foreign government. The Court
emphasized that Congress focused on corporate ownership when it drafted the FSIA.
Because a corporate shareholder only has an ownership interest in the corporation for
which they hold shares, and not the corporation’s subsidiary, bestowing immunity upon a
subsidiary amounts to piercing the corporate veil.
The Southern District of New York proposed a solution, in dicta,174 which is a
better approach than that espoused by the Supreme Court in Dole. Musopole implied that
when determining whether an entity is an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state it
is helpful to determine the beneficial interest held by the government in order to achieve
the ultimate purpose of the FSIA, which is to insure that “foreign states” receive uniform
treatment by federal courts, thus insuring consistency in U.S. foreign policy.175 This
interpretation is not only a fair compromise between the strict and broad interpretations,
advanced by the Ninth and Seventh Circuits respectively, but alleviates the risk produced
by Dole of creating inconsistent foreign policy. Dole effectively creates the bright line
rule sought by Congress to produce uniformity in decisions to confer sovereign
immunity. However, Dole does not address Congress’ ultimate concern, which was a
rule which would aid the executive branch to conduct successful foreign policy by not
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subjecting foreign government-owned corporations to litigation in United States courts,
or at least to produce safeguards against biased jury trials. Instead, Dole limits immunity
to those corporations that are directly owned by a foreign government, while denying
immunity to all other corporations where the foreign government has a substantial
interest in the outcome of litigation. The “beneficial interest” test, on the other hand
grants immunity to all corporations that are owned by a foreign government, and where
the foreign government has a substantial interest in the outcome of litigation. Thus,
Congress should legislatively overrule Dole and codify the beneficial interest test because
it is the approach to achieve Congress’ intent.
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